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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues pertain to appellants' appeal of the trial court's dismissal of David 
Jorgensen. 
1. Does this Court lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal on the basis that appellants 
never filed a notice of appeal of the order dismissing David Jorgensen ("Jorgensen") in the 
proceedings below? 
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing Jorgensen based upon a statute of limitations 
defense? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES, RULES. AND REGULATIONS 
§ 78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not 
founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account 
for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on 
a store account; also on an open account for work, labor or 
services rendered, or materials famished; provided, that action in 
all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within 
four years after the last charge is made or the last payment is 
received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the 
following sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific 
situations limits the time for action to one year, under 
Section 25-6-10; 
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(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided by law. 
§ 78-12-26. Within three years. 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real 
property; except that when waste or trespass is committed by 
means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of 
action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party 
of the facts constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal 
property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except 
that in all cases where the subject of the action is a domestic 
animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the time 
of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal stayed or 
was stolen from the true owner without the owner's fault, the 
cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the 
possession of the animal by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; 
except that the cause of action in such case does not accrue until 
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the 
fraud or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this 
state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this 
state, except where in special cases a different limitation is 
prescribed by the statutes of this state. 
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-
3, except that the cause of action does not accrue until the 
aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm 
suffered. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The following facts pertain to plaintiffs' appeal of the trial court's dismissal of 
defendant/appellee Jorgensen. 
1. Plaintiffs/appellants' complaint in the underlying action, CivilNo. 920903507-CV, 
was filed on June 19, 1992. [R. 1-72] 
2. Appellants' amended complaint was filed on or about July 13, 1992. [R. 73-151] 
3. The amended complaint set forth causes of action arising out of and related to the 
construction by plaintiffs of an office building for Robert J. DeBry. The sale of the subject 
building was completed on December 13, 1985. [R. 225] After the sale of the subject building 
was completed, Robert J. DeBry ("DeBry") filed an action, Civil No. C86-553, against 
appellants Del K. Bartel ("Bartel") and Dale Thurgood ("Thurgood") for alleged deficiencies in 
the construction of the building. Bartel and Thurgood subsequently counterclaimed against 
DeBry. The Honorable Pat B. Brian presided over Civil No. C86-553. 
4. Jorgensen was hired as an attorney by Robert J. DeBry and Associates in 
September of 1985. He terminated employment with Robert J. DeBry and Associates in April 
of 1986. [R. 355-356] 
5. In the prior lawsuit, Civil No. C86-553, Bartel and Thurgood filed an amended 
third-party complaint on August 24, 1987, setting forth claims against David Jorgensen. [R. 
303-321] In the referenced amended third-party complaint, Bartel and Thurgood alleged as 
follows: 
32. That third-party defendant David M. Jorgensen conspired 
with plaintiffs [Robert J. DeBry] to defraud third-party 
plaintiffs [Bartel and Thurgood] out of funds due under the 
trust deed and note. [R. 308] 
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6. In the underlying action, Jorgensen moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. 
On November 17, 1988, Bartel and Thurgood filed a memorandum in opposition to Jorgensen's 
motion to dismiss. [R. 322-354] In that memorandum, Bartel and Thurgood cited as reasons 
why the third-party complaint should not be dismissed the same allegations that are set forth 
against Jorgensen in the amended complaint in the action that is the subject of this appeal, Civil 
No. 920903507 CV. Bartel and Thurgood argued that the third-party complaint should not be 
dismissed due to the alleged perjurious affidavit of Scott McDonald [R. 327]; Jorgensen's 
alleged knowledge that DeBry never intended to pay the trust deed [R. 326]; Jorgensen's alleged 
knowledge of DeBry's delay-causing activities prior to closing [R. 326]; Jorgensen's conspiracy 
to defraud Bartel and Thurgood out of moneys due and owing [R. 326]; and Jorgensen's 
participation in the closing of the purchase of the building [R. 327]. Bartel and Thurgood 
attached as an exhibit to the opposition memorandum excerpts from the deposition of Scott 
McDonald dealing with the affidavit appellants claim was perjurious. The deposition is dated 
May 10, 1988 and shows that Thurgood and Bartel were in attendance. [R. 347-354] 
7. In the instant action, appellants asserted the following causes of action against 
Jorgensen: Conspiracy, perjury, aiding and abetting active interference, abuse of process, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. [R. 101-107] 
8. Jorgensen moved to dismiss the action against him on the basis that appellants' 
causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations. [R. 358-359] The trial court entered 
an order dismissing Jorgensen on April 1, 1993. [R. 1569-1571] Appellants then requested that 
the order dismissing Jorgensen be certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. [R. 1794-1796] However, the lower court refused to do so. 
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9. Other defendants in the case were dismissed pursuant to motions for summary 
judgment on July 10, 1995 [R. 3551-3557] and those dismissals were certified by the lower court 
as final on September 28, 1995. [R. 3585-3587] Appellants subsequently filed a notice of 
appeal on October 27, 1995 concerning only those dismissals reflected in the September 28, 
1995 order. [R. 3588-3590] This notice of appeal does not purport to appeal the April 1, 1993 
order dismissing Jorgensen and was never served on Jorgensen or his counsel. In fact, at the 
same time the appellants filed their notice of appeal, they again asl^ ed the lower court to certify 
the order dismissing Jorgensen as final under Rule 54(b). The notice to submit by appellants 
is dated November 17, 1995. [R. 3591-3593] On December 12, 1995, the lower court entered 
an unsigned minute entry granting the appellants' renewed motion for Rule 54(b) certification 
in respect to defendant Jorgensen. [R. 3598] 
10. After appellants failed to file a proposed order within 15 days, counsel for 
appellees Kenneth W. Karren and Kenneth W. Karren, Jr. (herein collectively referred to as the 
"Karrens") drafted and circulated a proposed final order on January 3, 1996. That order was 
subsequently submitted to the lower court and signed on January 10, 1996. [R. 3600-3603] The 
notice of entry of judgment was sent by Karrens' counsel to all parties the following day. [R. 
3604-3607] Since that time, appellants have never filed a notice of appeal of the lower court 
order dismissing Jorgensen. 
11. Jorgensen filed a motion for summary disposition of the appeal based on lack of 
jurisdiction which was denied by this Court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL DUE TO 
THE FACT THAT APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF 
APPEAL AS TO DEFENDANT JORGENSEN. 
Jorgensen was dismissed in the underlying action on April 1, 1993. The order of 
dismissal was not a "final" order until the lower court granted Rule 54(b) certification by virtue 
of its January 10, 1996 order. Therefore, plaintiffs were required to file a notice of appeal 
within thirty days of that date. Appellants have not only failed to file a notice of appeal as to 
Jorgensen within thirty days of the date of that order, but have in fact never filed a notice of 
appeal. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS' CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT 
JORGENSEN WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
ON THE BASIS THAT ALL CAUSES OF ACTION WERE BARRED BY 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
Appellants' causes of action against Jorgensen for conspiracy, perjury, aiding and 
abetting, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by the 
statute of limitations set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26. 
Appellants were aware of all these causes of action no later than August 24, 1987, when 
appellants filed a third-party complaint against Jorgensen in civil action C86-557. Appellants 
did not file a complaint in this matter until June 19, 1992, which results in appellants' causes 




THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL DUE TO 
THE FACT THAT APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF 
APPEAL AS TO DEFENDANT JORGENSEN. 
The trial court in the underlying action entered an order dismissing Jorgensen on April 
1, 1993. At that time, appellants requested that the court certify the order of dismissal as final 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), but the trial court refused to do so. 
Other defendants were subsequently dismissed pursuant to motions for summary judgment 
on July 10, 1995 [R. 3551-3557], and those dismissals were certified by the lower court as final 
on September 28, 1995. [R. 3585-3587] The appellants subsequently filed a notice of appeal 
on October 27, 1995 concerning only those dismissals reflected in the September 28, 1995 order. 
[R. 3588-3590] The notice of appeal does not purport to appeal the April 1, 1993 order 
dismissing Jorgensen and was never served on Jorgensen nor his counsel. In fact, at the same 
time appellants filed their notice of appeal, they again asked the lower court to certify the order 
dismissing Jorgensen as final under Rule 54(b). [R. 3591-3593] On December 12, 1995, the 
lower court entered an unsigned minute entry granting appellants' renewed motion for Rule 54(b) 
certification in respect to defendant Jorgensen. [R. 3598] 
After appellants failed to file a proposed order within 15 days, counsel for the Karrens 
drafted and circulated a proposed final order on January 3, 1996. That order was subsequently 
submitted to the lower court and signed on January 10, 1996. [R. 3600-3603] Notice of entry 
of judgment was sent by Karrens' counsel to all parties the following day. Since that time, 
appellants have never filed a notice of appeal to the lower court order dismissing Jorgensen. 
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Appellants failure to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the trial court signed the 
order granting Rule 54(b) certification (January 10, 1996) constitutes a clear jurisdictional defect. 
Therefore, this court must dismiss the appeal of the order dismissing Jorgensen. See Swenson 
Assoc.'s Architects v. State. 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994); Neerines v. Utah State Bar. 817 
P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1991). The fact that this case involves pro see appellants is of no 
consequence. See Wisden v. Bangerter. 893 P.2d 1057 (Utah 1995); Bugers v. Maiben. 652 
P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982). 
It is apparently the position of appellants that their October 27, 1995 notice of appeal 
conferred jurisdiction on this court to hear the appeal dismissing Jorgensen. However, that 
argument is not well grounded in fact or law. 
The notice of appeal was never served on Jorgensen or his counsel. Therefore, this court 
has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the order dismissing Jorgensen. Rule 3(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure provides as follows: 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. 
The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing 
of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a 
copy thereof to counsel of record of each party to the 
judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by 
counsel, then on the party at the party's last known 
address. 
This court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal without proper notice being given. See Yost 
v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 1981). 
In addition, the notice of appeal does not even reflect an appeal of the order dismissing 
Jorgensen. In fact, it expressly recognizes that the order dismissing Jorgensen has not yet been 
made final in accordance with Rule 54(b). The dismissal of Jorgensen was not a "final decision" 
at that point, and any attempt to take an appeal would have been premature. See e ^ , A. J. 
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MacKav. Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991) (appeal dismissed where 
the order appealed from was not yet final); Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991) 
(where an appeal could not be taken from an earlier dismissal until the proper Rule 54(b) 
certification was made or until a final judgment). 
It is, therefore, clear that the October 1995 notice of appeal did not in any way confer 
jurisdiction upon this court to hear an appeal of the order dismissing Jorgensen. Jorgensen is 
not a proper party to this appeal. Therefore, Jorgensen should be dismissed as a party from this 
appeal. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS' CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST JORGENSEN WERE 
PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS THAT 
ALL CAUSES OF ACTION WERE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
All of the causes of action alleged by the plaintiffs against Jorgensen sound in tort. A 
tort cause of action accrues when it becomes remediable in the courts. In other words, when 
all elements of the cause of action come into being. Davidson Lumber Sales Inc. v. Bonneville 
Inv. Inc.. 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990); Fredricksen v. Knight Land Corp.. 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 
1983) (Statute of limitations begins to run the moment the cause of action arises.); Brigham 
Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const.. 744 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Utah 1987) (In construction contract 
cases an owners claim of defective construction against contractors is generally considered to 
accrue on the date the construction is completed.) 
Appellants filed their amended complaint asserting, inter alia, causes of action against 
Jorgensen on June 19, 1992. Appellants alleged the following causes of action: Conspiracy; 
suborning perjury; aiding and abetting; abuse of process; intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. [R. 101-107] 
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Appellants' claims against Jorgensen accrued no later than the date that Jorgensen left 
the employment of Robert DeBry & Associates. All of Jorgensen's activities which are 
complained of occurred during his employment with Robert DeBry & Associates. His 
employment with Robert DeBry & Associates ended in April of 1986. However, in any event, 
it is clear that appellants (Bartel and Thurgood) discovered all elements of the causes of action 
now alleged by the date that they filed their amended third party complaint against Jorgensen 
in the underlying action, C86-553. In their third party complaint, Bartel and Thurgood set forth 
essentially the same causes of action against Jorgensen as are alleged against in the amended 
complaint in Civil No. 920903507-CV, the case presently before this court on appeal. If one 
uses the date of the filing of the amended third party complaint as the date of accrual of these 
causes of action, August 24, 1987, then all of plaintiffs' causes of action are clearly time barred. 
A. Appellants' Conspiracy Theory is Barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. 
Appellants have asserted a conspiracy cause of action against David Jorgensen based upon 
his representation of Robert DeBry in the closing on the subject building. [R. 101-104] It is 
also alleged that Jorgensen verbalized threats of a lawsuit against the plaintiffs prior to the 
closing date if plaintiffs did not agree to the payment of DeBry's loan costs and extension fees. 
It is further alleged that after the closing, Jorgensen continued to conspire with the DeBrys by 
making impossible demands of the plaintiffs in regard to final completion of the building. It is 
also claimed that Jorgensen conspired with DeBry in drafting the initial complaint against the 
plaintiffs in civil action C86-553. Based on this conduct, it is alleged that Jorgensen worked 
with the DeBrys to defraud the plaintiffs. 
All of the activities of which appellants complain occurred and were concluded prior to 
the date that Jorgensen left the employment of Robert J. DeBry and Associates (April, 1986). 
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It is also clear that appellants were aware of the above-described activities on the date of their 
occurrence. Thus, appellants' cause of action for conspiracy accrued no later than April of 
1986. Plaintiffs had four years from that date in which to file an action pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25. Plaintiffs did not file this action within four years of that date, and therefore 
their conspiracy action is barred as a matter of law. 
If appellants' conspiracy theory is interpreted to state a cause of action in fraud, the result 
is no different. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) specifies that an action for fraud must be 
commenced within three years of the date of discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud. It is readily apparent that appellants were well aware of the alleged fraud 
prior to the date that Jorgensen left the employment of Robert J. DeBry and Associates. 
However, in any event, plaintiffs were clearly aware of the existence of a potential cause 
of action for fraud when they filed their third-party amended complaint on August 24, 1987, 
wherein they alleged that "David M. Jorgensen conspired with plaintiffs [DeBry] to defraud 
third-party plaintiffs [Battel, Thurgood, and Cascade] out of the funds due under the trust deed 
and note." [Emphasis added] Giving the appellants every benefit of the doubt, their cause of 
action for fraud would have accrued on this date and they would have had until August 24, 1990 
in which to file an action against Jorgensen for fraud. This action was not filed until June 19, 
1992, and is therefore barred. 
1. Appellants' Cause of Action Against Jorgensen for Conspiracy Did Not 
11
 Accrue" at the Time Jorgensen Gave Testimony at Trial in Civil Action C86-
553. 
It is apparently appellants' position that prior to the time that Jorgensen testified at trial 
in the underlying action, that they did not know all of the facts necessary to pursue an action 
against Jorgensen and that their first opportunity to "carry an action against Jorgensen" came at 
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trial in June of 1990. It is appellants' position that prior to this trial, Robert DeBry had 
threatened Jorgensen to keep him quiet. Appellants' argument is misplaced for several reasons. 
It is obvious that appellants were on notice of sufficient facts to file the third-party 
complaint on August 24, 1987. In their response to defendant Jorgensen's motion to dismiss in 
civil action No. C86-553, appellants Battel and Thurgood asserted as follows: 
Plaintiffs Del K. Bartel and Dale Thurgood filed a third-party 
complaint on August 24, 1987, wherein they asserted that 
Jorgensen was the DeBry's attorney, that he interacted with the 
plaintiffs in regard to the building, that he received cost 
information through plaintiff, that he authored or co-authored 
documents for the DeBrys, that he negotiated final costs, and that 
he conspired with the DeBrys to defraud the plaintiffs. [R. 418] 
In spite of this knowledge, appellants claimed that they were unable to discern 
"additional" facts due to the assertion of the attorney-client privilege by Robert J. DeBry and 
Jorgensen. However, if appellants had truly believed that they were entitled to pierce the 
lawyer-client privilege, then the appellants should have brought a motion before the trial court 
requesting the same. Appellants cannot now argue that their cause of action did not accrue 
because they did not fully pursue discovery in a prior proceeding. 
Appellants' argument to the trial court was that they could not, under any circumstances, 
pierce the lawyer-client privilege. However, this is not the case. Rule 504 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence provides that the lawyer-client privilege can be pierced if there is a claim of fraud. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule; 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of 
the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid 
anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client 
knew or reasonably should have known to be a 
crime or fraud; . . . 
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See also, State v. Carter. 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1978) (if, and when, a lawyer and his 
client engage in a criminal conspiracy to commit a crime or a tort, contrary to law and good 
morals, there is no protected confidential relationship as to any statements made by the client). 
It has been uniformly held that the privilege may be pierced upon the establishment of 
a prima facie case of fraud. Pearce v. Stone. 720 P.2d 542, 548 (Ariz. App. 1986); Wallace 
Saunders v. Louisburg Grain Co.. 824 P.2d 933, 938-39 (Kan. 1992); Matter of Mendel. 897 
P.2d 68, 73-74 (Alaska 1955); Munn v. Bristol Bav Housing Authority. 777 P.2d 188, 195 
(Alaska 1989). Therefore, appellants, at the time of the filing of the third-party complaint in 
the original action, could have brought a motion before the court to pierce the attorney-client 
privilege. Appellants cannot now be heard to argue that their cause of action did not accrue 
because they did not fully pursue discovery in the prior proceeding. 
It is also important to note that the appellants' third-party complaint in the prior action, 
Civil No. C86-553, was dismissed due to appellants' failure to allege with sufficient particularity 
their fraud cause of action. [R. 418] The court did not find that the third-party complaint failed 
to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. The court merely held that the 
appellants failed to plead the cause of action with sufficient particularity. The appellants were 
well aware of facts in respect to the alleged fraud at the time the third-party complaint was filed. 
The fact that the appellants did not "artfully" plead the fraud cause of action does not operate 
to toll the statute of limitations. 
The statute of limitations on a fraud cause of action begins to run when the facts 
constituting the fraud were or should have been discovered. Once appellants were put on 
sufficient notice of facts, the statute of limitations began to run. Appellants were not required 
to know each and every detail of their fraud cause of action for the cause of action to accrue. 
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As was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Gibson v. Jensen. 158 P. 426 (Utah 
1916), wherein the court stated: 
Now, the evidence is undisputed that the plaintiff was fully advised 
of the fraud that was practiced upon her by Healy, if any 
actionable fraud was practiced upon her, as early as June 27, 
1909, in a letter from Mr. Healy to her in which he made a full 
statement respecting his faults in the transaction. By comparison 
of the complaint with the statements contained in the letter 
aforesaid, and of plaintiffs own admissions when testifying, it 
appears that she was advised of every essential fact which was 
necessary for her to know in order to bring an action if she felt 
disposed to bring one. It was not necessary for her to be informed 
of all of the details. [Citation omitted] If she was made aware of 
the principal or controlling facts, it was sufficient. By that we 
mean it was sufficient if she was fully informed of such facts as 
would put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence upon 
inquiry. If she was so informed, then she had all the information 
contemplated by the statute. 
14. at 427; see also, Richardson v. Mac Arthur. 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971) (statute began 
running when the facts constituting the fraud were or should have been discovered); Koulis v. 
Standard Oil of CaL. 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah App. 1987); Larson v. Utah L. & T. Co.. 65 
P. 208 (Utah 1901) (where relief is sought on the ground of fraud, the statute does not begin to 
run until the discovery of the fraud, or the discovery of such facts as would put a person of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry). 
In the instant case, appellants were on notice of the potential fraud claim no later than 
the date that the third-party complaint was filed (August 24, 1987). By that date, appellants 
were well aware of sufficient facts which would start the running of the statute of limitations. 
The fact that appellants may have failed to flesh out those facts does not alleviate their 
responsibility to file the action within the requisite time period. See e.g., Baldwin v. Barton, 
850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1995) ("The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A 
party who has opportunity of knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive 
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and afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches or 
negligence." [Citation omitted]). 
B. Appellants' Cause of Action for Suborning Perjury is Also Barred by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26(3). 
Appellants claim that David Jorgensen met with Scott McDonald and produced an 
affidavit with the intent of fabricating evidence to support the Debry's claims in the underlying 
case. Therefore, this cause of action sounds in fraud. 
It cannot be disputed that appellants were aware of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the procurement of the affidavit of Scott McDonald ["McDonald"] no later than 
May 10, 1988. On that date, the deposition of McDonald was taken and Thurgood and Battel 
were present at that deposition. In that deposition, McDonald discussed the facts and 
circumstances concerning the affidavit which was prepared by Jorgensen and signed McDonald. 
In their memorandum in opposition to Jorgensen's motion to dismiss the amended third-party 
complaint, appellants characterized the facts and circumstances as follows: 
After the sale of the building third-party defendant David 
Jorgensen secretly contacted defendant Scott McDonald to plead 
with him to mischaracterize the closing and sale in order to keep 
his job. He tearfully begged Scott McDonald to sign a document 
he authored in order to ease the plaintiffs' wrath against him and 
to save his job. [R. 327] 
Thus, it is undisputed that appellants were aware of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the McDonald affidavit no later than May 10, 1988. Thus, giving 
appellants every benefit of the doubt, their action for fraud had to be filed by May 10, 1991. 
Even if appellants claim that this cause of action is somehow governed by the four year statute 
of limitations, it still results in appellants' action being time barred. 
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1. Appellants' Cause of Action Against Jorgensen for Suborning Perjury Did 
Not Accrue at the Time Jorgensen Gave Testimony at Trial in Civil Action 
C86-553. 
If appellants contend that their cause of action for suborning perjury did not accrue until 
Jorgensen gave testimony in civil action C85-553, then Jorgensen submits that the same 
arguments and authorities cited previously in rebuttal to appellants' claim that their cause of 
action for conspiracy did not accrue until the time Jorgensen gave testimony at trial in civil 
action C86-553 is controlling. Appellants were well aware of all essential elements of their 
alleged cause of action for suborning perjury no later than May 10, 1988. 
C. Appellants' Cause of Action For Aiding and Abetting Active Interference is Barred 
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. 
In this cause of action, appellants have asserted that Jorgensen, in conjunction with his 
representation of DeBry, was aware of DeBry's conduct in regard to the completion and 
purchase of the building and acted in concert with DeBry in interfering with the plaintiffs' work. 
It is also alleged that Jorgensen was an active participant in DeBry's plan to prevent appellants' 
completion of the construction of the building. 
This cause of action is also barred by the four year statute of limitation set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-25. Appellants were aware of the conduct giving rise to this cause of action 
on the date of its occurrence. Moreover, when appellants filed their amended third-party 
complaint against Jorgensen, on August 24, 1987, this same conduct was alleged. 
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1. Appellants Did Not Have Four Years From Their "Discovery" of the Alleged 
Aiding and Abetting Active Interference Cause of Action in Which to File 
This Action. 
It is also apparently the appellants' position that they have four years from the date of 
discovery of the facts involving their "active interference" claim in which to bring an action 
against Jorgensen. In respect to this cause of action, the appellants have asserted that Jorgensen 
was aware of DeBrys' conduct in regard to the purchasing of the building and acted in concert 
with DeBry in interfering in appellants' work. It is also alleged that Jorgensen was an active 
participant in DeBrys' plans to prevent appellants' completion of construction of the buildings. 
It should be initially noted that the discovery rule is not applicable to this cause of action 
and appellants' "active interference" claim is clearly barred by the four-year statute of limitations 
set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. Appellants were well aware of the conduct giving rise 
to this cause of action on the date of its occurrence. In any event, when appellants filed their 
amended third-party complaint against Jorgensen on August 24, 1987, the same type of conduct 
was alleged. 
D. Appellants' Cause of Action Against Jorgensen for Abuse of Process is Barred by the 
Statute of Limitation. 
Appellants allege that Jorgensen assisted in the production of certain fabricated documents 
during his employment with Robert J. DeBry and Associates. It is also alleged that Jorgensen 
was actively involved in initiating frivolous litigation against the appellants. Based upon these 
allegations, appellants have set forth an abuse of process claim against Jorgensen. 
However, the conduct complained of occurred during Jorgensen's employment with 
Robert DeBry and Associates. That employment was terminated in April of 1986. Therefore, 
this action would have accrued no later than April of 1986, and is barred by either the three-year 
or four-year statute of limitations. 
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Giving plaintiffs every benefit of the doubt, it is clear that appellants were aware of the 
allegations set forth in this cause of action no later than the date that they filed their third-party 
complaint against Jorgensen. If that date, August 24, 1987, is used as the date of accrual, then 
appellants' cause of action for abuse of process is also time barred. 
E. Appellants9 Cause of Action Against Jorgensen for Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress is Also Barred by the Statute of Limitation. 
Appellants have alleged that Jorgensen intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the 
plaintiffs by participating with the DeBrys in interfering with the plaintiffs' completion of the 
building. It is also alleged that Jorgensen caused further emotional distress to the plaintiffs 
during his representation of DeBry. 
All of the conduct complained of occurred during the time period that Jorgensen was 
employed by DeBry. That employment ended in April of 1986. Thus, this cause of action 
would have accrued no later than April of 1986. This cause of action is also subject to a four-
year statute of limitations as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. Appellants clearly did not 
file this cause of action within the requisite time period. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the authorities and arguments set forth above, appellee David Jorgensen 
respectfully requests that this Court either dismiss appellants' appeal based upon lack of 
jurisdiction or affirm the trial court's dismissal of Jorgensen based upon appellants' failure to 
file their complaint within the applicable statutes of limitation. 
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DATED this 2. day o f December, 1996. 
STRONG & HANNI 
[J>pfM. Belnap 
RobertL/Janicki 




I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed, 
first-class postage prepaid, this 3 day of December, 1996, to the following: 
Del K. Bartel 
Appellant Pro Se 
P. O. Box 57234 
Murray, Utah 84157-0234 
9264 South 3400 West 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Dale Thurgood 
Appellant Pro se 
190 South 350 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
John A. Anderson 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry 
19 
D. Gary Christian 
Heinz J. Mahler 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Attorneys for Appellees Robert J. DrBry 
and Associates, and Edward T. Wells 
Blake Atkin 
ATKIN & LILJA 
136 South Main Street, Suite 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee Dale Gardiner 
Craig R. Maringer 
Rob M. Alston 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellees Kenneth W. Karren 
and Kenneth W. Karren, Jr. 
Craig C. Coburn 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Attorneys for Appellees 
James Bailey and David Mu 
ADDENDUM 
Rule 504. Lawyer-client. 
(a) Definitions, As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, 
association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who 
is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a 
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the 
client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the law-
yer in a rendition of professional legal services. 
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain 
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, 
on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with 
the lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the, 
course of representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and! 
the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative 
incidental to the professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably^ 
necessary for the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services 
to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers," 
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of com-
mon interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's repre-
sentatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in 
any combination. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
client, the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a 
deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corpo-
ration, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The 
person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to 
have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were 
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit 
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or 
fraud; or 
(2) Claimants through same deceased client As to a communica-
tion relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same 
deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intes-
tate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client As to a communication rele-
vant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the 
client to the lawyer; or 
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to 
an issue concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting wit-
ness; or 
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of com-
mon interest between two or more clients if the communication was made 
by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered 
in an action between any of the clients. 
